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Antitrust and Property (Including
Intellectual): First Principles
Fred S. McChesneyt

Judge Easterbrook opened the proceedings with insightful
remarks on antitrust and information generally. Much of what
Judge Easterbrook had to say in his keynote address relates to
the problem that antitrust takes too static a view of markets
when a particular case arises. The growing focus of antitrust on
prices and quantities (as opposed to preserving a "small is beautiful" economy,1 one that protects "small dealers and worthy men"2 )
is certainly laudable. But when litigation arises, whether prices
are higher and quantities lower nonetheless tend to be judged as
things of the moment. That analysis is overly static.
So, as Judge Easterbrook said, too often the possibility that
new entry may well solve any anticompetitive problems is ignored. True, there are opinions like that of Judge Winter in the
Waste Management case, carefully considering the possibility of
entry and relying heavily on it.3 But more typically, entry is ignored, or its importance minimized. The Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission Merger Guidelines,4 for example,
only pay attention to entry that will occur within two years.
Why only two years? In a good, rip-roaring antitrust case,
discovery lasts more than two years. After thirteen years of litigation in the IBM case, no decision was in sight. If the courts can't
resolve problems of competition within two years, why should

t Northwestern University: Class of 1967/James B. Haddad Professor, Law School;
Professor, Department of Management and Strategy, Kellogg School of Management.
1 See generally, Ernst Friedrich Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: Economics as if
People Mattered (Harper 1993).
2 United States v Trans-MissouriFreightAssociation, 166 US 290, 323 (1897).
3 United States v Waste Management, Inc, 743 F2d 976, 982 (2d Cir 1984) ("The Supreme Court... has held that appraisal of the impact of a proposed merger upon competition must take into account potential competition from firms not presently active in the
relevant product and geographic markets.").
4 U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger
Guidelines (GPO 1997).
5 Id at § 3.2.
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markets be held to that standard as a condition of avoiding government interference?
Even were there no supply-side reactions to anticompetitive
thrusts, other dynamic forces are usually at work on the demand
side. Consumer desires change, often in response to technological
developments in other markets that make new products available. A monopoly in, say, cassette stereo players, while quite possibly lucrative some time ago, is of little importance now that
CDs are the norm, and even they may fast become a thing of the
past with MP3 players' increasing popularity. An alleged monopolist of baseball cards has little anticompetitive potential once
boys' tastes switch to Pokemon cards.
Judge Easterbrook made an important point with respect to
the overly static nature of antitrust when he observed that, if
plaintiffs are successful, much antitrust would effectively freeze
progress in otherwise rapidly evolving markets. His point is particularly salient when it comes to information markets, and
Judge Easterbrook mentioned a few computer-related cases.' But
he could just as well have been describing more mundane products, such as Instamatic cameras. In the Berkey Photo case, it
was defendant Kodak's speed and extent of innovation about
which plaintiffs complained.' Although the plaintiffs in Berkey
Photo were unsuccessful, there is every chance that the public
and private plaintiffs in the various Microsoft cases will not come
away so empty-handed, even as consumers reveal their preferences for newer products and markets in which Microsoft competes fiercely.
In the spirit of Judge Easterbrook's remarks, let me begin by
noting a similar problem of antitrust's overly static nature that
relates to intellectual property issues. The problem derives from
the way that antitrust law often has viewed property more generally. Modern antitrust law commendably focuses on consumer
welfare, particularly as measured by prices consumers pay. Under the standard welfare-economic paradigm, lower prices translate directly into increased consumer welfare. And so it follows
that producer activities (concerted or unilateral) that raise
price-such as directly fixing prices or practices that reduce
quantities and so raise price indirectly-are undesirable.

6

Frank H. Easterbrook, Information and Antitrust, 2000 U Chi Legal F 1, 8-9.

7 Berkey Photo, Inc v Eastman Kodak Co, 603 F2d 263, 279, 283 (2d Cir 1979) (de-

scribing Berkey Photo's allegations).
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That in itself seems unobjectionable, even praiseworthy, especially when measured against older antitrust notions of protecting competitors. 8 But in some situations, focusing on prices
and quantities can be a mistake, if consumer welfare is the objective of antitrust. To talk of the price charged or the quantity produced for any good is implicitly to assume that the good exists.
But what if higher prices (and/or restricted quantities) are necessary for the good to come into existence in the first place?
The law concerning patents explicitly recognizes that this can
happen. Monopoly rents are permitted-indeed, encouraged-as
an incentive to bring the good into existence. Higher prices are
the reward for the up-front investment necessary to create the
patented product. Antitrust has not been indifferent to how the
rents are earned (that is, how the patents are used). But the basic
idea is not questioned that some goods will not be created this
year unless a subsequent period (say, seventeen years) of monopoly rents is allowed. As Judge Easterbrook wrote in an influential
article fifteen years ago, "the grant of patent rights, though creating a restriction of output during the patent's life, is important
to give people incentives to invent. There is a tradeoff between
optimal incentives ex ante and optimal use of existing knowledge."9
The point that people must have an incentive to incur the upfront costs of invention is not controversial in the slightest for
patents. Further, the Supreme Court has been deferential of collective activity raising prices in other intellectual property areas,
such as copyright, because that activity also generates new property.1 ° In that respect as well, it is acknowledged that there is an
up-front investment which, like work on products that can be
patented, will subsequently require higher prices than would
otherwise obtain.
Antitrust, however, typically draws the line between rights
officially granted by statute (the patent or copyright laws, for example) and attempts to create intellectual property not protected
by statute. Suppose, for example, that the product at issue is
original dress designs that are being stolen by "style pirates" who
then sell the "knock off' designs at lower prices, as of course they
can do since they have not expended any resources in the deSee, for example, Brown Shoe Co, Inc v United States, 370 US 294 (1962).
9 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 Tex L Rev 1, 13 (1984).
10 BroadcastMusic, Inc v Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc, 441 US 1, 18-22 (1979)
(describing invention and necessity of the blanket license).
8
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signing. The style pirates are nothing more than free-riders on
the creative efforts of the original-design manufacturers.
Avoiding free riding on others' creative efforts is precisely the
problem that patent and copyright protection is supposed to
solve. In the long run, if the free-riding is not stopped, the
amount of creative activity will diminish (if not disappear altogether). If antitrust were a consistent body of law, it would treat
creation of new designs the same way it treats patents. Just as
patents protect the creative efforts of patentors and antitrust law
allows patent holders to charge higher prices for their patented
products, antitrust would also defer to private self-help efforts to
accomplish the same thing achieved by patents.
However, antitrust law takes the opposite view, focusing only
on the higher prices charged later but ignoring the role of those
higher prices in causing the product to come into existence in the
first place. The style piracy case described above is familiar to all
antitrust lawyers, resulting in a judgment of per se illegality
against the dress designers collectively trying to prevent theft of
their original designs by boycotting retailers purchasing from the
style pirates.1 Other cases could be cited in which attempts at
creation of property likewise were penalized by antitrust laws.12
The point is that all new products fit the economic model of
patent and copyright law. All require fixed-cost investments up
front, and thus also require some ability to charge prices that risk
seeming supracompetitive (that is, above the cost of making the
product), resulting in a reduction of quantity as compared to the
quantity that would be sold if prices were lower. The marginal
cost for use of informational technologies is usually very low, once
those technologies have been developed. On the other hand, the
up-front fixed costs of developing those technologies are relatively
high.
There are contractual ways that informational inventors and
innovators can try to assure themselves of recouping the costs of
these investments. But they risk running afoul of the law, especially if they allow the innovator to become a dominant firm in
the market and so subject to increasing scrutiny under § 2 of the

11
12

Fashion Originators'Guild of America, Inc v FTC, 312 US 668 (1941).
See, for example, United States v Topco Associates, Inc, 405 US 596, 608 (1972)

(collective creation of a new brand name requiring territorial exclusivity declared per se
illegal).
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Sherman Act. The United Shoe case is an excellent example of
this problem. 3
Finally, it should be noted that entrepreneurs invest in
things other than patents, copyrights and other intellectual property. They invest in capital of all sorts, such as human capital
and reputational capital. While the form of capital created is different from that commonly characterized as "intellectual property," the economics of the creation are no different. Up-front investments are made in the expectation that, if successful, the investments will yield higher returns in the future. And thus the
possibility of antitrust challenge down the road must be anticipated.
But because this line of discussion takes us away from the
subject of immediate interest, I will stop here. Suffice it to say
that the worlds of antitrust and intellectual property are not always in sync, and that attempts to get them in better alignment
are both interesting and important.

13 United States v United Shoe Machinery Corp, 110 F Supp 295, 297 (D Mass 1953)
(describing defendant's business practices and rise to monopoly power in the industry).

